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U
IlL HE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
held its fourteenth annual Economic Policy Con-
ference on October 19-20, 1989. Nearly 75 years
since November 16, 1914, when it and the other
regional banks of the Federal Reserve System
opened for business, the Bank chose this occa-
sion to review the recent monetary policy ex-
perience in the United States. The papers and
discussion below offer an overview of the con-
ference proceedings that will be published later
this year.1
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Allan H. Meltzer, University Professor and
John M. Olin Professor of Political Economy at
Carnegie Mellon University, presented the con-
ference’s main paper, a critique of Federal Re-
serve performance since 1964. Because extensive
surveys by Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and
Brunner and Meltzer (1964) thoroughly examined
the policy record of the System’s first 50 years,
Meltzer chose to analyze recent Federal Reserve
performance. Overall, he argued that the Fed’s
performance has been poor and that whether
the public has benefitted from the existence of
the Federal Reserve System is questionable.
His reasons for this assessment were several.
Perhaps foremost among these has been the
Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s)
focus on money market conditions and free re-
serves (member bank excess reserves minus
member bank discount window borrowings) as
indicators of monetary policy’s restraint or
stimulus. This focus, in the view of Meltzer and
many others, inevitably translates into an objec-
tive for the federal funds rate that creates two
systematic policy problems. The first problem is
that short-term interest rates often give an in-
correct view of monetary policy’s thrust. For ex-
ample, by interpreting rising nominal interest
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rates as an indication of “tight” monetary policy
when, in fact, they merely reflect the infla-
tionary consequences of excessive past money
growth, the Fed gets a mistaken signal to ease;
falling nominal interest rates provide the op-
posite (and still incorrect) signal to tighten mon-
etary policy.
By reading market conditions incorrectly,
Meltzer argued, the Fed’s approach creates a
second problem: procyclical patterns in money
growth. To support his argument Meltzer cited
several episodes when monetary policy was
restrictive when viewed from a fed funds rate
perspective, but expansionary when viewed
from a money growth perspective. In Meltzer’s
view, these procyclical policy actions caused or
contributed importantly both to the rising and
permanent inflation of the last 25 years and to
every recession of the postwar period.
Meltzer also argued that the FOMC’s reliance
on forecasts of future economic activity to imple-
ment current monetary policy has led to serious
policy mistakes. The reason is that the forecast
errors made by the Board of Governors’ staff
are so large that its analysis cannot distinguish
whether in the current quarter the economy is
in a boom or a recession. Moreover, the fore-
casts appear to be biased, consistently under-
estimating future inflation. This is not to say, as
Meltzer was careful to note, that the Board
staff’s forecasts demonstrate inferior perfor-
mance on its part; to the contrary, many studies
have shown these forecasts to be at least as ac-
curate as any available alternative. Instead, even
if the Board’s forecasts reflect the highest stan-
dards of the economics profession, the wide
range of forecast errors can mislead policy-
makers into making policy changes in the wrong
direction.
Among other criticisms of Federal Reserve
performance discussed by Meltzer are vague
and changing policy statements that confuse
market participants about the course of policy,
mistakes associated with implementation of the
FOMC’s “monetarist experiment” of 1979-82 and
the return to an interest rate objective for policy
since 1982 disguised as an objective for borrow-
ings from the discount window.
To improve future Federal Reserve perfor-
mance, Meltzer advocates the adoption of a rule
for monetary policy with explicit targets for
growth of the monetary base. Should these tar-
gets be missed, the Board would be required to
explain the reasons for its failure to achieve
them. In another change from the current struc-
ture, the President would be given the option of
accepting the Board’s explanation or requiring
the resignation of the members.
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Because Meltzer’s paper covered a broad
range of topics, three discussants were asked to
comment on specific pieces of his analysis. Jef-
frey A. Miron, University of Michigan, in-
vestigated whether the Federal Reserve has con-
tributed to economic stability by reviewing a
consistent data set since 1870. Over intervals of
10 years or longer, Miron’s analysis concluded
that real economic growth has been nearly a
full percentage point lower in the post-world
War TI period compared with 1870-1913; even
more striking was the contrast of price stability
(actually, a slight average annual decline in the
price level) in the period before 1913 with the
4.4 percent average annual inflation rate since
1947. Finally, comparisons of standard devia-
tions showed little change in the variability of
output over time. Overall, Miron’s analysis sup-
ported Meltzer’s arguments about monetary
policy actions causing the extended peacetime
inflation, but contradicted the argument that
the Federal Reserve had reduced output vari-
ability significantly. Miron argued, however,
that finding the Fed to be associated with only
small reductions in output variability should not
be surprising since its emphasis has been on
smoothing financial market conditions (interest
rates) in ways and at times that often exacer-
bate output variations.
K. Alec Chrystal, City University of London,
then made comparisons between monetary
policy in the United States and the policies im-
plemented by the world’s other major central
banks. He argued that Switzerland, west Ger-
many and Japan, by adhering to monetary
targets in most years, have been able to achieve
reasonable price stability. Moreover, when ex-
ternal pressures on exchange rates induced
these central banks to abandon their money
growth targets, the cost was higher inflation in
subsequent years. Chrystal also was critical of
efforts by the Federal Reserve and foreign cen-
tral banks to influence exchange rates through
intervention activities because, in his view, it
added considerable uncertainty about the thrust
of monetary policy and economic performance
in the future. Finally, he argued that the finan-
cial system in the United States undoubtedly
would be more stable if geographic restrictionsMonetary Policy on the 75th Anniversary of the
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adoption of a money stock target for policy
that, in his mind, was quite similar to the pro-
posal made at the end of Meltzer’s paper. But,
Kohn recalled, this procedure failed as well,
perhaps suggesting that the implementation of
monetary policy in practice is different from
that in theory.
Kohn explained why the money stock targets
were abandoned as a guide to policy in 1982 by
listing well-known arguments: the impact of
financial innovations, especially nationwide in-
troduction of NOW accounts, on Ml; the in-
creasing interest elasticity of Ml; the abrupt
shift in the trend growth rate of velocity. Al-
though Kohn did not make the case directly, he
implied that many of these problems might have
been expected because the monetarist argu-
ments for money stock targets were based on
empirical regularities rather than an underlying
structural theory of how monetary policy af-
fects economic activity. Meltzer’s discussion of
targeting the monetary base also was rejected
for the instability in its velocity and the belief
(based on a simulation experiment by the Board
staff) that it would produce unacceptably large
variations in interest rates.
Kohn ended his discussion by summarizing
the current policy process adopted by the FOMC.
He noted that the Committee’s members monitor
the economy’s performance by using a variety
of indicators and that both interest rates and
exchange rates receive considerable attention as
variables that transmit policy actions to the
economy; the monetary aggregates continue to
receive some attention as well but more in
terms of long-run economic performance. Cur-
rent procedures lead to frequent, small adjust-
ments in the thrust of policy to achieve the
Committee’s stated goal of promoting economic
expansion through price stability.
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Having debated the successes and failures of
actual Federal Reserve behavior in the first ses-
sion, Alex Cukierman, Tel Aviv University, at-
tempted to explain why the Fed had chosen to
behave in a particular manner. Specifically, he
tried to answer the question: “why Does the
Fed Smooth Interest Rates?”
Cukierman constructed a choice-theoretic
model of Fed behavior in which the Fed was
market stability as policy objectives. In his mod-
el, changes in bank profits affect financial stabili-
ty by altering the risks of bank failures; more-
over, bank profits are assumed to be negatively
correlated with interest rates. These relation-
ships provide the intuitive result that the Fed
will focus relatively more on price stability
when bank profits are high (and the risk of
bank failures is low) and more on financial sta-
bility when bank profits are low (and the risk
of failures is high). In practice, this systematic
switching between the two goals of monetary
policy leads to interest rate smoothing and that
such a policy of interest rate smoothing has an
inflationary bias. Finally, he noted that his theo-
retical model is consistent with changes in inter-
est rate behavior after the founding of the Fed
reported by Mankiw, Miron and Weil (1987).
In commenting on Cukierman’s analysis,
Michelle R. Garfinkel, Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis, chose to focus on ambiguities in the
definition of “financial stability” and the Federal
Reserve’s objective function that could affect
Cukierman’s qualitative results. For example,
she questioned whether maximizing bank pro-
fits was a socially desirable objective for mone-
tary policy in the context of the model. More-
over, she argued that the Fed might have two
policy instruments (e.g., reserve requirements
and the growth of reserves) to achieve two of
its objectives; in this event, the tradeoffbetween
price stability and financial stability implied by
Cukierman need not exist. Garfinkel also argued
that Cukierman’s particular choice of a one-shot
Nash equilibrium was responsible for the infla-
tionary bias in his model and that choosing
another equilibrium could eliminate this feature
of his analysis. She then presented an alternative
model in which the Fed could achieve its goal of
financial stability while simultaneously reducing
the inflationary bias.
Following this positive discussion of why the
Fed has chosen to adopt various policies and
practices, Edmund S. Phelps, McVickar Pro-
fessor of Political Economy at Columbia Univer-
sity, addressed two normative aspects of central
bank behavior: Should its discretion be limited
by a policy rule and should price stability be its
primary (if not sole) objective? The focus of this
broad topic was narrowed and made more rele-
concerned both with price stability and financial vant to the actual policy process by limiting thediscussion to a group of concrete proposals that
have been offered to limit the Fed’s discretion
and achieve price stability. The proposals re-
viewed included those by Hall (1984), McCallum
(1988), Meltzer (1984), and Melzer (1987).
Phelps raised several criticisms with the gener-
al notion of policy rules to achieve price stabili-
ty. Perhaps most relevant to the experience of
the 1980s is that the growth rate of velocity
must be trend-stationary. If not, shocks to veloci-
ty may carry it far from its trend path without
eventually returning to it. Under these circum-
stances, the targeted ranges for the monetary
base or some monetary aggregate would have
to be revised occasionally to account for shocks
to its behavior. But, in Phelps’ view, this reason-
able response to dealing with actual shocks
would, in reality, give a central bank convenient
excuses for missing its announced targets; even-
tually, the potential to offer ox post explanations
for target misses would remove credibility from
the rule and render it ineffective as a constraint
on policy discretion.
Another criticism of a rule such as that pro-
posed by McCallum is that greater stability in
the growth of, say, the monetary base, can be
expected to be associated with greater volatility
in other variables; of particular concern to
Phelps in this regard were the CPI and employ-
ment. Sluggish adjustment of wages, for exam-
ple, could exacerbate the negative employment
effects of a supply shock if the mechanics of a
policy rule did not permit some monetary ac-
commodation of the shock. Phelps also raised
the important issue of defining “price stability”
precisely as (1) a constant inflation rate, (2) a
constant aggregate price level or (3) limiting the
variability of the price level within some narrow
band. Finally, he was concerned about the
unknown, but potentially large, start-up costs as
the transition was made from discretionary poli-
cies to the implementation of the rule.
Manfred J.M. Neumann, University of Bonn,
criticized Phelps for not providing a clear
framework to evaluate each rule’s operating
characteristics relative to its final goals. Neumann
analyzed whether several proposed rules could
respond to current shocks, changes in trend
velocity or output shocks and whether any of
them would guarantee an expected inflation
rate equal to zero. Against these criteria,
Neumann found that only Meltzer’s (1984) pro-
posal was consistent with each standard.
Neumann, however, questioned the need for a
coercive rule when, instead, better monetary
policy performance might be achieved from a
monetary constitution that creates “the ultra-
conservative central banker.” This constitution
would free the central bank from iesponsibility
for supporting the government’s output, em-
ployment or exchange rate policies and leave it
free to concentrate only on price stability.
Moreover, the people making monetary policy
would serve for long terms and be paid salaries
comparable to those in the private sector. These
features (and several others) would create a
central bank truly independent from political
pressures, a condition that in Neumann’s view is
crucial for the achievement of price stability.
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Like most activities, conducting monetary
policy generally will produce results that are
above or below the desired objective if the
wrong phenomenon is being analyzed. Thus,
while many observers have commented on the
“anomalous” behavior of Ml and its velocity in
the 1980s, another viewpoint argues that their
“unusual” behavior stems from the fact that the
monetary aggregates, as currently constructed
and reported, do not measure the theoretical
concept that we call “money.” william A.
Barnett, University of Texas at Austin, reported
the results of his continuing attempt to con-
struct a monetary aggregate consistent with
microtheoretic foundations.2
Barnett’s previous investigations of the
characteristics of a desirable monetary index
number assumed risk-neutrality on the part of
individuals. In this conference paper, he con-
sidered the consequences of incorporating risk
aversion, an issue that had been raised in work
by Poterba and Rotemberg (1987). In his ex-
tended framework, Barnett argued that an ag-
gregate monetary variable has to be derived
from a four-step process consisting of checks
for admissibility, approximation, monitoring and
application. These steps determine which assets
can be grouped to form an aggregate, how the
2Barnett’s paper was co-authored with Melvin 1-linich,
University of Texas at Austin and Piyu Yue, visiting
scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.individual assets will be weighted within the ag-
gregate, how closely the resulting index tracks
the theoretically ideal measure and how well
the aggregate performs in its final use.
After deriving and applying the microeconomic
and index number principles consistent with
these guidelines, Barnett advocated the use of a
monetary measure that he calls “Theoretic M2.”
He then demonstrated that large empirical dif-
ferences exist between the theoretic aggregates
and the official simple-sum aggregates reported
by the Federal Reserve. He also found differ-
ences, although much smaller, between Ijivisia
aggregates constructed under the assumption of
risk neutrality and the theoretic aggregates that
allowed for risk aversion. Barnett concluded
that the Federal Reserve should abandon its
simple-sum measures of the money stock and
construct new measures following the statistical
practices of the Bureau of Labor Statistics and
other government agencies.
Although generally in agreement with Barnett’s
argument, Julio J. Rotemberg, Massachusetts In-
stitute of Technology, raised several issues
regarding Barnett’s strategy. For example, he
suggested a revision in weighting the dollar
values of individual asset categories when con-
structing an aggregate monetary variable. Rather
than using r~ — r,, the difference between the in-
terest rate on a benchmark asset (one that
yields no liquidity services) and the i’’ asset’s
own rate of return at some base period,
Hotemberg suggested using (L~’).
This revised measure has the advantage that
sensitivity to choice of a base period is elimi-
nated and the addition of new assets to the ag-
gregate is a straightforward operation, should
that become necessary. Perhaps more important,
however, is that a model with risk aversion will
include some measure of expected returns, which
will introduce errors into the measurement of
any aggregate. But while an error in a Divisia
aggregate will persist forever, the error will ap-
pear only in the period it occurs in Rotemberg’s
“currency equivalent” (CE) measure. Rotemberg
also suggested that a different benchmark rate
of return should be used (stock market returns
rather than the yield on a long bond) and that
further testing is required to determine which
assets legitimately can be aggregated as a group
(rather than merely re-weighting the Board’s of-
ficial groupings called Ml, M2, etc.). In his reply
that Rotemberg’s suggested revisions to his
currency-equivalent index do indeed produce a
measure of the economic stock of money.
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The real business cycle approach to economic
fluctuations raises the question of whether mon-
etary policy has any significant effect on real
economic activity. While most economists ac-
knowledge the primary, if not exclusive, rela-
tionship between changes in the nominal quanti-
ty of money and changes in the aggregate price
level, establishing a link between nominal mon-
ey and the business cycle has long been debated
by macroeconomists. Charles I. Plosser, Univer-
sity of Rochester, examined this issue; his con-
clusion was that explanations of variations in
real economic activity should focus on shocks to
“tastes and technology” rather than on changes
in the money stock.
Plosser first surveyed prominent studies that
attribute an important role to the money stock
for explaining fluctuations in real output. Prima-
ry among these references are those by Fried-
man and Schwartz (1963) and Homer and
Romer (1989) who identify explicit business
cycles and discuss the monetary policy changes
that coincide with them. Plosser noted that,
while several of the important episodes clearly
reflected changes in monetary policy, these poli-
cy changes were “real” as opposed to “nominal”
ones. That is, rather than a change in the nomi-
nal money stock (as one often thinks of a mone-
tary policy change), these episodes often involved
adjustments in reserve requirements, which are
better classified as real changes that affect rela-
tive prices and, in turn, induce reallocations of
resources. Thus, Plosser argues, while previous
authors may have been correct to attribute a
particular business cycle movement to a mone-
tary policy change, they were wrong to con-
clude that the causal factor was a change in the
nominal stock of money. Instead, in his view, it
was a real change (such as a change in reserve
requirements) that was the cause of the eco-
nomic fluctuation.
Plosser supported his argument by examining
correlations of the components of Ml and M2
(the source base, the reserve adjustment magni-
tude (RAM) and the appropriate multiplier) and
to Rotemberg’s comments, Barnett demonstrated various deposit to currency ratios with thegrowth of real output to see whether real or
nominal aspects of monetary policy changes
were more closely related to output growth. In
these simple correlations, as well as more elabo-
rate VAR results, Plosser found the evidence
generally to be consistent with his view that
changes in the nominal quantity of money alone
have had relatively minor effects on real eco-
nomic activity.
In his comments on Plosser’s paper, N.
Gregory Mankiw, Harvard University, generally
agreed with Plosser’s specific conclusion that it
is difficult to find a significant correlation be-
tween changes in nominal money and real out-
put. However, Mankiw disagreed with Plosser’s
overall conclusion that money is neutral even in
the short run. Mankiw argued that, even if the
Fed were not the cause of fluctuations in out-
put, monetary policy still could be very impor-
tant to how the economy reacts to an exogenous
real shock. For example, if shocks to technology
caused output fluctuations, monetary policy
may be able to help the economy adjust to this
new output path and avert even larger declines
in output. Mankiw also disagreed with Plosser’s
criticisms of theories that attempt to explain
why changes in money may affect output.
Mankiw argued that, while perhaps correct in
his comments on specific theories, Plosser had
overlooked a more fundamental issue—because
no economic theory is “complete,” a combina-
tion of different theories may be necessary to
explain real world phenomena. Because the real
world is “messy,” then perhaps, in Mankiw’s
view, economic reasoning will inevitably be
messy as well.
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